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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
v. 
PHILIP E. HOLLEN, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 971018-CA 
NOTICE OF ERRATA 
COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, Philip E. Hollen, by and 
through counsel, Scott L Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins, 
P.C, and files this Notice of Errata in the Brief of Appellant, 
which was previously filed with this Court on September 14, 1999, 
On page 35 of Argument III1 of the Brief of Appellant, counsel 
Argument III of the Brief of Appellant addresses appointed 
trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on the 
lesser included offense of unlawful detention. See Brief of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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for Defendant / Appellant inadvertently cited the wrong version 
of the Aggravated Kidnaping statute. Counsel intended to set 
forth the following version of the Aggravated Kidnaping statute, 
which reads in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if 
the person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will 
of the victim, by any means and in any 
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports the victim: 
(a) and in committing, attempting to 
commit, or in the immediate flight after 
the attempt or commission of the 
kidnaping, the actor possesses, uses, or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) with intent: 
(ii) to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, 
or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1999). The undersigned counsel 
emphasizes that this corrected citation of the Aggravated 
Appellant, p. 34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Kidnaping statute in no way affects the force or substance of 
Argument III set forth in the Brief of Appellant. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 1999. 
VD\ WIGGINS, P.C. 
_Scott^£r Wigc 
Attorneys (Eojj* Defendant / 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF ERRATA by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following on this 15th day of September, 1999: 
Ms. Christine F. Soltis 
Criminal Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake Cit\(7SJT 84114-0854 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to have the 
trial court make the requisite constitutional determination as to 
the admissibility of the eyewitness identification, deprived 
Defendant of his constitutional rights to due process and the 
effective assistance of counsel. To make such a showing, 
Defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient 
performance, falling below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance 
was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). 
Such claims present mixed questions of law and fact. Strickland 
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v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984). 
When available, the appellate court defers to the trial court's 
findings of fact, but reviews its application of legal principles 
to its factual findings for correctness. State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 
1, 4-5 (Utah 1993). 
2. Whether appointed trial counsel, based on the 
unwarranted assumption of Defendant's guilt, breached his duty of 
loyalty to Defendant and thereby deprived Defendant of his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel by 
failing to accurately advise Defendant of the surrounding 
circumstances of his constitutional right to testify. In 
addition to the two-prong test discussed above, the United States 
Supreme Court in Strickland recognized that prejudice may be 
presumed when there has been actual or constructive denial of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2067 (1984) . Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the appellate court may, pursuant to '"inherent supervisory power 
over the courts'" presume prejudice in circumstances where it is 
"'unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to 
weigh actual prejudice.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 
n.6 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994) 
(quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 (Utah 1992)). 
6 
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3. Whether appointed trial counsel, by failing to request 
a jury instruction concerning the lesser included offense of 
unlawful restraint, deprived defendant of his constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. See discussion of 
the standard of review for the review of claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel set forth above in Statement of Issue / 
Standards of Review No. 1. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, and the constitutional right of an accused 
to have the trial court determine the constitutional reliability 
of eyewitness identifications prior to consideration of the same 
by a jury. 
Several months after the robbery at issue in this appeal, 
Mr. Hollen was charged with aggravated robbery, aggravated 
kidnaping, and aggravated assault. At trial, five reputed 
eyewitnesses testified and identified Mr. Hollen as one of the 
7 
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robbers. Mr. Hollen was subsequently convicted and this appeal 
followed. 
Pursuant to a Rule 23B Motion filed by Mr. Hollen, this 
Court remanded this case to the trial court for a Rule 23B 
evidentiary hearing on various issues of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. After various proceedings, which included a hearing 
on the requested amendment of the initial findings of fact, the 
trial court signed the Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of 
Fact. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In the early morning hours on June 25, 1995, two 
individuals robbed the Cinemark 10 movie theaters in Layton, Utah 
(R. 7, Affidavit for Warrant of Arrest; R. 101, Transcript of 
Trial, Vol. I). 
2. Witnesses gave descriptions of the two robbers. Among 
other things, they described one as blond and wearing cowboy 
boots (R. 509, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 
2). The witnesses described the other as dark with Hispanic 
coloring and wearing a white gauze bandage on his left cheek (Id; 
see also R. 103, lines 7-11, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I); R. 
163, Transcript of Trial (Vol. II); Id. at R. 192-93; Id. at R. 
216) . 
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3. There was no physical evidence found at the scene (R. 
509, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 3) . 
4. Initially, two suspects other than Mr. Hollen and his 
co-defendant, Mr. Jeffrey D. Mecham, were considered by police 
{Id. at R. 509, No. 4). 
5. One suspect, Mr. Michael Cantu, was dark complected 
with Hispanic coloring and had been seen with a gauze bandage 
similar to the one described by witnesses as being worn by one 
the robbers {Id. at R. 510, No. 5; R. 103-04, R. 125, Transcript 
of Trial, Vol. I). 
6. The Layton City Police Department assembled a black and 
white photo lineup that included a picture of Mr. Cantu, which 
was presented to witnesses (R. 510, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing 
Findings of Fact, No. 6; R. 104, lines 12-23, R. 105, Transcript 
of Trial (Vol. I). Upon viewing the black and white photo 
lineup, one of the witnesses, Ms. Megan Brimhall, "said that Mr. 
Cantu looked quite similar to the person that she had in mind" 
(R. 107, lines 1-4, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I). Thereafter, 
upon viewing the color photos of Mr. Cantu, Ms. Brimhall "backed 
up a step and put her hand to her mouth" and began shaking. She 
then stated, "That looks like him" (R. 107, lines 5-16, 
Transcript of Trial (Vol. I); R. 510, Rule 23B Evidentiary 
Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 6). Various other witnesses picked 
9 
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Mr. Cantu's picture and identified it as looking like the robber 
with the bandage (R. 108, lines 16-20, R. 109, lines 12-14, R. 
127-28, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I). 
7. The police arrested Mr. Cantu and conducted a physical 
lineup at which one of the witnesses, Ms. Heidi Maroney, 
identified Mr. Cantu as both the person that sounded like and was 
most like the robber with the bandage (Id. at R. 112-13). Mr. 
Cantu, however, was subsequently released (Id. at R. 113, lines 
13-24) . 
8. A second individual, Mr. Dennis Dougherty, also became 
a suspect when a search of his residence revealed gauze bandages 
and cowboy boots similar to those allegedly worn by the robbers 
{Id. at R. 114-15) . When officers showed the bandage and tape to 
the witnesses, they identified the bandage and medical tape as 
being ''identical" to that utilized by the robber with the bandage 
(Id. at R. 128-29). Notwithstanding, the Layton City Police 
Department did not inquire of the Salt Lake Police Department 
whether a co-defendant that matched the robber with the bandage 
was under investigation (Id. at R. 238, lines 20-24) . The police 
prepared a photo lineup that included Mr. Dougherty's picture and 
showed the lineup to witnesses, but none of the witnesses could 
identify Mr. Dougherty as one of the robbers (Id. at R. 115-16). 
10 
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9. About four months after the robbery, the Salt Lake City 
Police Department contacted the Layton City Police Department and 
provided the names of Mr. Philip E. Hollen and Mr. Jeffrey D. 
Mecham1 as suspects because of their alleged involvement in what 
were thought to be similar robberies in Salt Lake County (Id. at 
R. 116, lines 14-19). 
10. Shortly thereafter, the Layton City Police Department 
prepared a photo lineup containing six photographs, one of which 
was that of Mr. Hollen and presented the photo lineup to various 
witnesses (Id. at R. 116, lines 14-19) . Each witness identified 
the photo of Mr. Hollen as being one of the robbers (Id. at R. 
118-22). 
11. Mr. Hollen was subsequently charged with aggravated 
robbery, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated assault (R. 10-11, 
Information), to which he pleaded not guilty (R. 12, Minute Entry 
- Notice). 
12. Mr. William J. Albright, a public defender, was 
appointed to represent Mr. Hollen (R. 511, Rule 23B Evidentiary 
Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 14). 
lSee companion appeal entitled State v. Mecham, Case No. 
971013-CA. 
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13. The police also arrested and charged Mr. Mecham, who 
was appointed Mr. Glen T. Cella as counsel (Id. at R. 511, No. 
15) . 
14. At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham 
were present and represented by their respective appointed 
attorneys {Id. at R. 512, No. 18). Various eyewitnesses were 
present at the Preliminary Hearing, who were "not called as 
witnesses," but appeared at the hearing just "to see what was 
going on." (R. 85, lines 18-19, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I). 
While at the Preliminary Hearing, the various eyewitnesses viewed 
Mr. Hollen and Mecham and recognized them as the accused while 
they were in custody, wearing handcuffs and jail clothing (Id. at 
R. 85, lines 19-21). 
15. After the Preliminary Hearing, both Mr. Hollen and Mr. 
Mecham were bound over for trial (R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary 
Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 22). 
16. Prior to trial, Mr. Hollen sent a letter to his 
appointed counsel, Mr. Albright, from prison, in which he asked 
Mr. Albright to consider the case of State v. Ramirez as it bore 
on the eyewitness identification of his case and to consider 
filing a motion to suppress the eyewitness identification (R. 
470, Letter from Mr. Philip E. Hollen to Mr. William J. Albright, 
dated June 5, 1996). Mr. Hollen further suggested that Mr. 
12 
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Albright look at the question of merger on the various charges 
(Id.) . 
17. Shortly before trial, Mr. Albright, along with Mr. 
Cella, filed a joint Motion in Limine to prohibit the State from 
"offering into evidence any reference regarding the 
identification of the Defendant by the witnesses arising from 
their presence at the Preliminary Hearing of March 27, 1996 and 
arising out of the photographic lineup." (R. 486-87, Motion In 
Limine) . The prosecution stipulated to the Motion in Limine (R. 
85, lines 9-22, Transcript of Trial (Vol. I). Neither the Motion 
nor the discussion in chambers between the trial court and 
counsel concerning the Motion included any identification of 
which witnesses were present at the Hearing or the legal effects 
of the eyewitnesses having viewed the accused under the 
circumstances {Id.). In fact, Mr. Albright, as trial counsel, 
was not aware of the identity of the eyewitnesses present at the 
Preliminary Hearing even though he was aware that the 
eyewitnesses had viewed Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham at the 
Preliminary Hearing as the accused robbers in custody, wearing 
handcuffs and jail clothing (Id. at R. 85, lines 19-21; see also 
R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 21). 
18. At trial, Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella jointly moved to 
dismiss the aggravated kidnaping and aggravated assault charges 
13 
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based on the legal principle of merger (R. 264-66, Transcript of 
Trial (Vol. II). The prosecution opposed the Motion as to 
aggravated kidnaping but did not oppose the Motion as it related 
to aggravated assault {Id. at R. 266-68) . 
19. The trial court denied the Motion as it related to 
aggravated kidnaping and granted the Motion by dismissing the 
aggravated assault charge {Id. at R. 2 68-69). In the course 
ruling on the Motion, however, the trial court stated "that in 
the event of conviction, any sentence would merge and it would be 
essentially as one crime." {Id. at R. 269, lines 3-5). 
20. As appointed trial counsel, Mr. Albright discussed with 
Mr. Hollen his right to testify. From the beginning, Mr. Hollen 
initially told Mr. Albright that he would not accept a plea 
bargain, that he wanted to go to trial, and that he would not 
testify. Consequently, Mr. Albright spent little time discussing 
Mr. Hollen's right to testify with him (R. 517, Rule 23B 
Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 37) . 
21. With knowledge that Mr. Hollen had a prior conviction 
for aggravated robbery, and that there were, at the time, similar 
charges pending against Mr. Hollen in Salt Lake County, Mr. 
Albright recommended to Mr. Hollen that he not testify, and Mr. 
Hollen followed that advice {Id. at R. 517, No. 38-39). 
14 
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22. At trial, five reputed eyewitnesses testified and 
identified Mr. Hollen as one of the robbers (R. 145-264, 
Transcript of Trial (Vol. II). Mr. Hollen was subsequently 
convicted and this appeal followed (R. 26-27, Judgment; R. 28-30, 
Notice of Appeal). 
23. Pursuant to the Rule 23B Motion filed by Mr. Hollen, 
this Court remanded this case for a Rule 23B evidentiary hearing 
on various issues of ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 374-
76, Order Granting Appellant's Rule 23B Motion). 
24. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Albright, among other 
things, testified that the first reason for not wanting to have 
Mr. Hollen testify at trial was that, based in his investigation, 
he did not want Mr. Hollen to testify because "he was the one 
that committed this crime." (R. 521, Transcript on Appeal (Rule 
23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 43, lines 19-20; R. 517, Rule 23B 
Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 40) . Mr. Albright 
based his determination not only on his investigation, but on the 
fact that Mr. Hollen "had a similar charge in Salt Lake for armed 
robbery", and that Mr. Hollen had the same co-defendant in his 
Salt Lake County case as he had in this case (R. 521, Transcript 
on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), pp. 43-44; R. 517, Rule 
23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 40). Mr. Albright 
also grounded his determination that Mr. Hollen had committed the 
15 
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crime on the fact that u[h]e never denied the offense." (R. 521, 
Transcript on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 44, line 
25, pp. 44-45; R. 517, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of 
Fact, No. 40). According to Mr. Albright's testimony, this was 
the "first" reason or basis for his "feelings" that Mr. Hollen 
should not testify at the trial (R. 521, Transcript on Appeal 
(Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 46, lines 4-8; R. 517, Rule 
23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, No. 40). 
25. After various subsequent proceedings, which included a 
hearing on the requested amendment of the initial findings of 
fact (R. 397-403, Motion to Amend and/or Clarify Findings of 
Fact), the trial court signed the Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing 
Findings of Fact2 (R. 519, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings 
of Fact). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Hollen of his 
constitutional rights to due process and the effective assistance 
of counsel by not presenting the issue concerning the 
admissibility of eyewitness identification to the trial court. 
By failing to do so, appointed trial counsel precluded Mr. Hollen 
2The Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact were 
approved by the State (See R. 519, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing 
Findings of Fact). 
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from that which he was entitled, namely, a preliminary 
determination of whether the eyewitness identification was 
sufficiently reliable so as not to deny him of due process under 
the Utah Constitution if such evidence is considered by the jury. 
The only defense available to Mr. Hollen at trial and the 
issue of central importance in this case was that of the 
unreliability of the eyewitness identifications. None of the 
identifications in this case were impervious to attack under the 
criteria set forth in Long and Ramirez. Furthermore, the 
identifications at trial were tainted by the witnesses' exposure 
to Mr. Hollen at the Preliminary Hearing, where the witnesses 
recognized Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant, Mr. Mecham, as the 
accused while they were in custody, wearing handcuffs and jail 
clothing. 
In sum, appointed trial counsel rendered objectively 
deficient performance by failing to require the trial court to 
analyze and make a preliminary determination as to the 
constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness identifications. 
Had trial counsel requested such a determination, there exists a 
high likelihood that the trial judge would have determined, at 
least in part, such eyewitness identifications to be inadmissible 
at trial. Consequently, the entire evidentiary picture is 
affected by trial counsel's failure. 
17 
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2. Appointed trial counsel, based on the unwarranted 
assumption of guilt, breached his duty of loyalty to Defendant 
and thereby deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel by failing to accurately advise 
Defendant of the surrounding circumstances of his constitutional 
right to testify. As evinced by the trial court's Rule 23B 
Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, appointed trial counsel, 
based on his unsubstantiated opinion that Mr. Hollen was guilty, 
constructively denied Mr. Hollen of the effective assistance of 
counsel and breached his duty of loyalty to Mr. Hollen as his 
client. 
3. By failing to request a jury instruction concerning the 
lesser included offense of unlawful restraint, appointed trial 
counsel deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. Appointed trial counsel's 
failure to timely request that jury instruction be given on the 
lesser included offense of unlawful detention fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light 
of existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(4), and Utah case law. But for trial counsel's 
deficient performance of failing to request such an instruction, 
Mr. Hollen would have had the opportunity to have the jury 
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consider and acquit him of the greater offense and convict him of 
the lesser, namely, unlawful detention. 
ARGUMENTS 
INTRODUCTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment3 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 1064. Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To 
prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered 
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988); see also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 
1998); accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "[T]he right to the 
3The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence." 
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effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 
364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant 
must '"identify the acts or omissions' which, under the 
circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 
2064 (footnotes omitted); see also Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 
(quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994)). A defendant must 
"overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support ua 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
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695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522; Frame, 723 P.2d 
at 405. In the process of arriving at this determination, the 
appellate court "should consider the totality of the evidence, 
taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the 
entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Templin, 805 
P.2d at 187; see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39-40 (Utah 
1996) . 
I. BY FAILING TO HAVE THE TRIAL COURT MAKE THE 
REQUISITE CONSTITUTIONAL DETERMINATION AS TO THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, 
TRIAL COUNSEL DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the procedure to be followed and the 
factors to be considered by a trial court in determining the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony under the due process clause 
of the Utah Constitution.4 Id. at 778-84. In the course of so 
doing, the Utah Supreme Court gave a broad overview of the law 
surrounding the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, 
which included a discussion about the separate and distinct roles 
of the prosecutor, judge, and jury. Id. at 778. 
4See Utah Const, art. I, § 7, which provides, "No person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
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According to Ramirez, "[t]he burden of demonstrating the 
admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the prosecution" to 
lay the requisite foundation. Id. Such a foundation is 
necessary for the trial court to make the necessary preliminary 
factual findings and legal conclusions concerning admissibility. 
Id.5 The judge, "as arbiter of the constitutional admissibility 
of an identification," is "required to scrutinize proffered 
evidence for constitutional defects." Id.; see also State v. 
Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). If presented 
with the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness identification, 
the trial judge must preliminariliy determine whether the 
identification is sufficiently reliable so as not to deny the 
accused of due process if considered by the jury. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 778. If admissible, the jury determines the weight to be 
given to such evidence. Id. 
In the course of discussing the roles of the judge and jury, 
the Utah Supreme Court expressed concern about the " [p]otential 
for role confusion and for erosion of constitutional guarantees 
inhere[nt] in th[e] overlap of responsibility of judge and jury . 
. ." Id. Accordingly, the Court emphasized the need for the 
trial court not to "abdicate its charge as gatekeeper to 
5
"The defendant is entitled to a determination by the court 
of the evidence's constitutional admissibility." State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991). 
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carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional 
defects . . . ." Id. Consequently, under Ramirez, the trial 
court must initially determine whether eyewitness testimony is 
constitutionally reliable prior to it being admitted. 
In determining whether an eyewitness identification is 
constitutionally reliable, the trial court must consider the 
following pertinent factors: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view 
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary 
one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed, and whether the race of 
the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 
1986)) . "The ultimate question to be determined is whether, 
under the totatity of the circumstances, the identification was 
reliable." Id. 
In the instant case, appointed trial counsel denied Mr. 
Hollen of his constitutional rights to due process and the 
effective assistance of counsel by not presenting the issue 
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concerning the admissibility of eyewitness identification to the 
trial court. By failing to do so, appointed trial counsel 
precluded Mr. Hollen from that which he was entitled, namely, a 
preliminary determination of whether the eyewitness 
identification was sufficiently reliable so as not to deny him of 
due process under the Utah Constitution if such evidence is 
considered by the jury. 
The only defense available to Mr. Hollen at trial and the 
issue of central importance in this case was that of the 
unreliability of the eyewitness identifications. Well-settled 
Utah case law discusses and summarizes the empirical studies 
questioning the reliability of eyewitness identification. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-80; Long, 721 P.2d at 488-92. "The 
studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion that human 
perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and 
fallible." Long, 721 P.2d at 488. 
Notwithstanding the fact that empirical research 
demonstrates the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness 
identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of such 
problems. "People simply do not accurately understand the 
deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the 
accuracy of the memory process of an honest eyewitness." State 
v. Maestas, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah April 9, 1999). In 
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fact, "the common knowledge that people do possess often runs 
contrary to documented research findings." Id. Because people 
do not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness identifications, 
they often give eyewitness testimony undue weight. Long, 721 
P.2d at 490. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ramirez, as previously 
discussed, leads to the conclusion that trial counsel faced with 
eyewitness identification of varying degrees of certainty and 
consistency should request and thus require the trial court to 
make a preliminary determination as to the constitutional 
reliability of the eyewitness identification. Such a preliminary 
determination ensures the constitutional admissibility of the 
eyewitness identification; thereby protecting the accused's 
constitutional right to due process. 
None of the identifications in this case were impervious to 
attack under the criteria set forth in Long and Ramirez. All of 
the witnesses had a limited opportunity to view the actor and a 
limited degree of attention during the event. See R. 156-57, 
Transcript of Trial (Vol. II) ("Combined thirty seconds maybe" to 
view actor and w[t]he whole he had me facing away");6 Id. at R. 
6Mark Mudrow, one of the eyewitnesses, testified at trial 
that on the night of the robbery he was not wearing his glasses, 
which he wears so that he can see distances. See R. 164-65, 
Transcript of Trial (Vol. II). 
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171-72 (dim lighted theater); Id. at R. 180, lines 13-16 ("Maybe 
two or three seconds"); Id. at 184 ("pretty dark . . . not well 
lit"); Id. at R. 184 ("Facing the wall the entire time"); Id. at 
R. 202, lines 20-24 ("Maybe four or five seconds"); Id. at R. 
217-18 (witness initially told detective that she was "looking 
away from the Hispanic-looking suspect"); Id. at R. 232-33 
("Wasn't aware of the other one", i.e., the suspect with bandage 
on face); Id. at R. 249, lines 1-6 ("Close to a minute"). The 
robbery was completed quickly and at least one half of the 
actor's face was obstructed with a large bandage. See id. at R. 
162, lines 21-24; R. 163, lines 13-42. 
In addition, there was approximately a four-month time lapse 
between the robbery and the time when Mr. Hollen became a suspect 
of the robbery. Id. at R. 101; R. 116, lines 14-19 (third time 
Police received information concerning possible suspects). Prior 
to that, two of the witnesses at trial had identified another 
individual by the name of Michael Cantu from a photo lineup as 
the actor or robber with the bandage on his face. Id. at R. 106-
07; R. 108, lines 16-20. In fact, when one of the witnesses was 
shown the photographs of Mr. Cantu, she "backed up a step and put 
her hand to her mouth" and began shaking. Id. at R. 107, lines 
9-15. She then stated, "That looks like him." Id. at R. 107, 
lines 15-16. 
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Additionally, due to the fact that the nature of the event 
being observed was a robbery, there existed a low likelihood that 
the witnesses would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly.7 
See, e.g., id. at R. 164, lines 12-13 ("frightened"); Id. at R. 
181, line 4 ("I was scared to death"); Id. at R. 184, lines 10-12 
("extremely scared"); Id. at R. 184, lines 14-17 ("nervous and 
scared, crying and -- . . . upset . . . unstable"); Id. at R. 
247, lines 5-8 (pointing gun around at "all of us"); Id. at R. 
249, lines 19-20 ("I was scared"). Moreover, some of the 
witnesses were making what they initially thought was a cross-
racial identification. Id. at R. 216, lines 5-18; R. 103, lines 
7-11; R. 192-93. 
Furthermore, the identifications at trial were tainted by 
the witnesses' exposure to Mr. Hollen at the Preliminary Hearing, 
where the witnesses recognized Mr. Hollen and his co-defendant, 
Mr. Mecham, as the accused while they were in custody, wearing 
handcuffs and jail clothing. Id. at R. 85, lines 19-21. 
Notwithstanding the knowledge of the tainted identifications, 
appointed trial counsel, other than an ineffectual motion in 
limine, made no effort to identify the extent of the tainted 
7This low likelihood is also due in part to the previously 
discussed passage of time from when the robbery occurred and when 
Mr. Hollen became a suspect. Further, the low likelihood is 
evinced by the apparent inaccurate or false identifications of 
Mr. Cantu by the witnesses a short time after the robbery. 
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identifications or to expressly exclude by name the witnesses 
present at the Preliminary Hearing. See R. 486-87, Motion In 
Limine. Neither the Motion nor the discussion in chambers 
between the trial court and counsel concerning the Motion 
included any identification of which witnesses were present at 
the Hearing or the legal effects of the eyewitnesses having 
viewed the accused under the circumstances that they did. In 
fact, trial counsel was not aware of the identity of the 
eyewitnesses present at the Preliminary Hearing even though he 
was aware that the eyewitnesses had viewed Mr. Hollen and his co-
defendant at the Preliminary Hearing as the accused robbers in 
custody, wearing handcuffs and jail clothing (Id. at R. 85, lines 
19-21; see also R. 513, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of 
Fact, No. 21.8 
In sum, under the facts of this case, appointed trial 
counsel rendered objectively deficient performance by failing to 
require the trial court to analyze and make a preliminary 
determination as to the constitutional admissibility of the 
eyewitness identifications. Had trial counsel requested such a 
determination, there exists a high likelihood that the trial 
judge would have determined, at least in part, such eyewitness 
Appointed trial counsel did not present expert testimony 
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. State 
v. Maestas, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Utah April 9, 1999). 
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identifications to be inadmissible at trial. Consequently, the 
entire evidentiary picture is affected by trial counsel's 
failure, especially in light of the fact that the verdict is not 
strongly supported by the record. Finally, the record does not 
reveal any reasonable tactic that would mitigate or ameliorate 
the deficiency. 
The failure of trial counsel to request the constitutional 
preliminary determination as to the admissibility of the 
eyewitness identifications seriously undermined the fairness of 
Mr. Hollen's trial. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 367 (Utah 
1993). Moreover, the omission by appointed trial counsel went to 
the heart of Mr. Hollen's defense -- that Mr. Hollen was 
mistakenly identified as the robber with the bandage, who 
initially was thought to have Hispanic features. 
II. APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL, BASED ON THE UNWARRANTED 
ASSUMPTION OF GUILT, BREACHED HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY 
TO DEFENDANT AND THEREBY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ACCURATELY ADVISE 
DEFENDANT OF THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TESTIFY. 
In determining whether trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective, the appellate court applies the two-prong test 
established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); see also Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 
282 (Utah 1995). The two-prong test is discussed in detail 
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above, and, as a result, will not be reiterated here except for 
the discussion which follows concerning the prejudice prong of 
the test. 
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
that prejudice may be presumed when there has been actual or 
constructive denial of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 
S.Ct. at 2 067.9 Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
the appellate court may, pursuant to "xinherent supervisory power 
over the courts'" presume prejudice in circumstances where it is 
^unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to 
weigh actual prejudice.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 
n.6 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994) 
(quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 (Utah 1992)). 
Moreover, * [c]ritical to the attorney-client relationship 
and the integrity of the judicial proceedings is an attorney's 
duty to represent the interests of a client with zeal and 
loyalty." State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994). So 
essential is the duty of loyalty to the judicial system that "its 
faithful discharge is mandated not only by the Rules of 
9See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, Ml U.S. 365, 374, 106 
S.Ct. 2574, 2582 (1986) ("The essence of an ineffective-
assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so upset 
the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the 
trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect") 
(Emphasis added). 
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Professional Conduct,10 but also, in criminal cases, by the Sixth 
Amendment right of a criminal defendant to the effective 
assistance of counsel." Id. (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 
U.S. 648, 656-57, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045-46 (1984)). "In almost 
all cases, defendants are wholly dependent on the dedication of 
their attorneys to protect their interests and to ensure their 
fair treatment under the law." Id. 
In the instant case, on remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court 
made the following Findings of Fact with respect to Mr. Hollen's 
waiver of the right to testify in reliance upon trial counsel's 
advice: 
Mr. Albright discussed with Defendant 
his right to testify. From the beginning, 
Mr. Hollen told Mr. Albright that he would 
not accept a plea bargain, that he wanted to 
go to trial, and that he would not testify. 
Because of Mr. Hollen's position, Mr. 
Albright spent little time discussing Mr. 
Hollen's right to testify with him. 
Mr. Albright was aware that Mr. Hollen 
had a prior conviction for aggravated 
robbery, and that he had been on parole from 
prison at the time of the robbery in June of 
1995. He was also aware that similar charges 
were pending in Salt Lake County for robbery 
of the Million Dollar Saloon. In that case, 
it was alleged that Mr. Hollen was also 
involved with Mr. Mecham, and that they had 
used small .22-caliber pistols. Mr. Hollen 
had been shot in that case at the scene. Mr. 
'See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7 cmt. 
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Albright was also aware that Mr. Hollen was a 
suspect in the robbery of Century 31 theaters 
in Salt Lake City. 
With that background, Mr. Albright 
recommended to Mr. Hollen that he not 
testify, and Mr. Hollen agreed to follow that 
advice. Mr. Hollen acknowledged that he did 
not want to testify on the record out of the 
presence of the jury at the time of trial. 
During Mr. Albright's testimony given at 
the Rule 23B evidentiary hearing, the first 
reason given by Mr. Albright for not wanting 
to have Mr. Hollen testify at trial was that, 
based in his investigation, he did not want 
Mr. Hollen to testify because "he was the one 
that committed this crime. " Mr. Albright 
based his determination not only on his 
investigation, but on the fact that Mr. 
Hollen "had a similar charge in Salt Lake for 
armed robbery", and that Mr. Hollen had the 
same co-defendant in his Salt Lake County 
case as he had in this case. Mr. Albright 
grounded his determination that Mr. Hollen 
had committed the crime on the fact that 
"[h]e never denied the offense." According 
to Mr. Albright's testimony, this was the 
"first" reason or basis for "feelings" that 
Mr. Hollen should not testify at the trial. 
See R. 516-18, Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact, 
Nos. 37-40 (Emphasis added). 
As evinced by the trial court's Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing 
Findings of Fact, appointed trial counsel, based on his 
unsubstantiated opinion that Mr. Hollen was guilty, 
constructively denied Mr. Hollen of the effective assistance of 
counsel and breached his duty of loyalty to Mr. Hollen as his 
client. See id. at R. 517-18, No. 40. Instead of basing his 
legal advice not to testify on a well-reasoned analysis of Utah 
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case law concerning the likely consequences of Mr. Hollen's 
testimony if he were to testify,11 appointed trial counsel simply 
failed to zealously pursue the interests of Mr. Hollen in the 
course of advising him not to testify. See R. 521, Transcript on 
Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 69, lines 3-12. 
Rather, with little of no consultation concerning the right to 
testify and the benefits and disadvantages of testifying at 
trial, trial counsel assumed Mr. Hollen's guilt and then utilized 
his unwarranted assumption as the basis for advising Mr. Hollen 
to waive his constitutional right to testify. Cf. Rule 1.2(a), 
Rules of Professional Conduct (stating that u[i]n a criminal 
case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to . . . whether the client will 
testify") (Emphasis added.).12 
Had trial counsel accurately advised Mr. Hollen concerning 
his constitutional right to testify and the fact that his prior 
convictions would have been excluded, Mr. Hollen probably would 
nSee State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986) (trial 
court abused its discretion by failing to exclude defendant's 
previous felony convictions). 
12As evinced by Mr. Hollen's testimony at the Rule 23B 
Evidentiary Hearing, he relied upon appointed trial counsel's 
advice not to testify because, as Mr. Hollen stated, u [H]e was my 
attorney, and [was] supposed to know what he was talking about." 
See R. 521, Transcript on Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing) , 
p. 69, lines 11-12) . 
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have testified in his own behalf. See R. 521, Transcript on 
Appeal (Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing), p. 69, lines 13-19. 
Admittedly, such testimony would have simply been that he did not 
rob the Cinemark 10 movie theaters, and that he had not attended 
a movie theater in Layton or Davis County. Id. at R. 521, p. 69, 
lines 23-25. However, Mr. Hollen's testimony could have provided 
a substantial impact on the jury in the course of its 
deliberations inasmuch as his conviction was ultimately based 
solely on eyewitness identifications of questionable 
constitutional admissibility. Cf. State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 
439, 441 (Utah 1996). 
III. BY FAILING TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION 
CONCERNING THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF UNLAWFUL 
RESTRAINT, APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DEPRIVED 
DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Appointed trial counsel's additional failure to request a 
jury instruction for the lesser included offense of unlawful 
restraint fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4). Section 78-1-
402(4) states: "The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." In 
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State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that subsection (4) of § 76-1-402 
does not require the court to weigh the 
credibility of the evidence, a function 
reserved for the trier of fact. The court 
must only decide whether there is a 
sufficient quantum of evidence presented to 
justify sending the question to the jury, a 
decision which must be made concerning all 
jury instructions in any trial. 
Id. at 159. 
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that whether an offense is a lesser included offense 
of another offense is determined "by comparing the statutory 
elements of the two crimes as a theoretical matter and, where 
necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial." Id. at 
97; see also State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Utah 1987) . 
The elements of aggravated kidnaping are set forth at Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995), which states: 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if 
the person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will 
of the victim, by any means and in any 
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports the victim with intent: 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; 
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In comparison, the elements of unlawful detention are set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304, which states that " [a] person 
commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains another 
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his [or her] 
liberty."13 
A comparison of the elements, as set forth above, indicates 
that unlawful detention is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish the commission of 
aggravated kidnaping. Based on this comparison, aggravated 
kidnaping cannot be committed without necessarily having 
committed unlawful detention and thus unlawful detention is a 
lesser and included offense of aggravated kidnaping. Cf. State 
v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1988). 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely request that 
jury instruction be given on the lesser included offense of 
unlawful detention fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law, the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4), and the cited 
Utah case law. But for trial counsel's deficient performance of 
failing to request such an instruction, Mr. Hollen would have had 
the opportunity to have the jury consider and acquit him of the 
Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-304(2) . 
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greater offense and convict him of the lesser, namely, unlawful 
detention. See State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 589-90 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Hollen respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse his conviction of Aggravated Robbery and 
Aggravated Kidnaping and for such other relief as the Court deems 
just and appropriate under the circumstances presented in this 
case and arguments set forth herein. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Mr. Hollen requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the novel issues 
in the instant appeal dealing with, among other things, the 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and 
the right of an accused, under circumstances such as those in the 
instant case, to have the trial judge make a preliminary 
determination as to the constitutional admissibility of 
eyewitness identification. Moreover, this appeal presents issues 
apparently of first impression concerning the waiver of the right 
to testify and the question of whether unlawful detention is a 
lesser included offense of aggravated kidnaping. These issues 
present matters requiring further development in the area of 
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criminal law for the benefit of the bar and public. Counsel for 
Mr. Hollen also requests that the method of disposition of the 
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For 
Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value and 
direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of September, 1999, 
OLD a WIGGINS, P .C. 
• f i G O t t - L WlC^  
Attorneyst^fcjr Defendant / 
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum A: Judgement 
Addendum B: Rule 23B Evidentiary Hearing Findings of Fact 
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MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 r , LS! , ( L : R v :^'c;: 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West S t a t e S t r e e t flUG Z3 | | IS flfi fSB 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 CLF^ ,' .;CURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICTAE[p^TRrfqT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILIP E. HOLLEN, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 961700231 
Hon. Rodney S. Page, Judge 
The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the 
17th day of July, 1996, the defendant being present in person and 
represented by his attorney, William J. Albright, the State being 
represented by Steven V. Major, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, 
Judge, presiding. 
The defendant having been convicted upon a finding of 
guilty of the offenses of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony 
and Aggravated Kidnaping, a first degree felony, and the Court 
having asked if the defendant had anything to say why judgment 
should not be pronounced; and no sufficient cause to the contrary 
being shown or appearing to the Court; 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the 
offenses of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and 
JUDGMENT, ENTERED w Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Aggravated Kidnaping, a first degree felony, as charged and 
convicted. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and 
imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of 
five years to life on each count, and is ordered to pay $11,500 
restitution jointly and severally with Jeffrey Devon Mecham, as 
provided by law. Parties notified of judgment in open court. 
Pursuant to Judgment and Commitment executed by the Court 
on the 17th day of July, 1996, the defendant has been transported 
to the Utah State Prison. It is recommended by the Court that the 
sentence herein ordered run concurrently with each other and 
consecutively with any other sentence the defendant is presently 
serving at the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this _2£T^day of g^^JT ' 1996-
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
JUDGE(J 
_ ^Delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment 
this c*2 day of August, 1996, to William J. Albright, Attorney 
for Defendant. 
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SCOTi L vvIGGINS, Bai No M.M 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C 
Amencan Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Ul 84101 
Telephone- (801)328-4^3 
Facsimile: \M) 1)328-4^1 
Attorneys for Defendant \pi -ii i .in 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNT\ 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DFPARTMFNT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) Case No. 961700231 
Plaintiff' Appellee, j Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 971018-CA 
) 
) 
) 
PHILIP E. HOI LEN, ) 
) 
Defendant Appellant. ) Judge Rodnc\ S Wwe 
FUN' HI! MJiJi N l l l i n HEARING FINDINGS OF FACT 
After temporary remand by the Utah Court ul \p|u\ ; ," •• nil lo Rult } Ui I 'l.ili 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the above-entitled matter came before the Court on May 29, 
1 ^%, l<» tin n idcntiary heanng tor the purpose of finding facts on the issues set forth in the 
Ordei Gi intmg \ppell ml hilr1 1 W* Mntinn < »n lh.il s j t t i r d a \ , the c o m p a n i o n case 
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entitled State v. Mecham, Case No. 961700230 (Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 970013-
CA), also came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 23B. At the evidentiary hearing on the above-entitled matter, the State 
was represented by Mr. David Cole, Deputy Davis County Attorney, and Defendant, Philip 
Earl Hollen, was present and represented by appointed appellate counsel, Mr. Scott L 
Wiggins. In addition, at the evidentiary hearing in the companion case of State v. Mecham, 
the State was represented by Mr. Steven Major, Deputy Davis County Attorney, and 
Defendant, Jeffery Devon Mecham, was present and represented by his attorney, Ms. 
Christine Decker. All parties and counsel stipulated that evidence and testimony presented 
in one case would be admissible in the other. 
On August 13, 1998, Findings of Fact from the evidentiary hearing were entered. 
Thereafter, on August 24, 1998, Mr. Hollen, through counsel, filed a Motion to Amend 
and/or Clarify Findings of Fact together with a supporting memorandum. The State did not 
respond. The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify Findings of Fact 
on December 8, 1998. At the hearing, Mr. Hollen was present and represented by counsel, 
Scott L Wiggins. Mr. Mecham was not present but was represented by newly appointed 
counsel, Ms. Laura K. Thompson. The State was represented by Mr. William K. McGuire. 
During the hearing, the Court granted the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify Findings of Fact 
2 
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i ,M ri^.i;ji.. memorandum on the 
other requested amendments or clarifications to the Finding of Pmi t I i I Vrniiillin I '•!, 
1998, Mr. Hollen, through counsel filed a Supplemental Memorandum as directed by the 
("run I I lie State did not respond. 
The ( Viurf li;i\ inj? heard Ihr n„ idnuv .ind Innnf hilly .ids r.ni in the premises finds the 
facts as set forth below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 Inthri\irh iiionimi1 IIOIII, on nun / K JVO \ inc Cinemark 10 movie theaters 
in Lay ton, Utah, was robbed by two men. 
2 V Witnesses gave descriptions of the two robbers. Among other things, they 
described out: as blond and wearing cowboy boots. The witnesses described the other as dark 
with Hispiin11> • oloini" and v CM""" » v hiU1 jviii/e bandage IM In? lell check I lie robbers 
were described as using small .22-caliber semiautomatic pistols. 
Here was no physical evidence found at the scene. 
riollenan. .. .
 A;.v.,- vLchamwere 
considered by police. 
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5. One suspect, Mr. Michael Cantu, was dark complected with Hispanic coloring 
and was seen with a gauze bandage similar to the one described by witnesses as being worn 
by one the robbers. 
6. The Layton City Police Department assembled a black and white photo lineup 
that included a picture of Mr. Cantu, which was presented to witnesses. A subsequent color 
photo lineup was also performed with a picture of Mr. Cantu. Certain witnesses picked Mr. 
Cantu's picture and identified it as looking like one of the robbers. One witness, Ms. Megan 
Brimhall, had a frightened emotional reaction to the color picture of Mr. Cantu when shown 
the picture. 
7. Based upon that information, Mr. Cantu was arrested and a physical lineup was 
conducted. At the physical lineup, one of the witnesses, Ms. Heidi Maroney, identified Mr. 
Cantu as both the person that sounded like and was most like the robber with the bandage. 
Mr. Cantu was subsequently released. 
8. A second individual, Mr. Dennis Dougherty, also became a suspect when a 
search of his residence revealed gauze bandages and cowboy boots similar to those worn by 
the robbers. A photo lineup that included Mr. Dougherty's picture was prepared by the 
police and shown to witnesses. None of the witnesses could identify Mr. Dougherty as one 
of the robbers. 
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9. i.,:* . h,
 Si;iii alter tiie robbery, in October 1995, the Layton City Police 
Department v\ns ronlai Inl h] ,S,ili I ala ( ill1, PnliiT 1 )epat1t!inil ami aiicu [he aaiiifs oil IVJr. 
Hollen and Mr. Mecham as suspects because of their alleged involvement- MI similar 
robbeiiO* sn Salt Lake County. 
10. Deu-. f Gardner oi tnc La vioiK *;> iw «c i department prepared a color 
photo lineup containing six photoi h I In1 piehnes 
were aF of similar dimension and general appearance. 
11. Detective Gardner presented the photo lineup to each w itness. Eacli of the 
sn ni <  illnesses idnilitlnl lihc |ilnnii nil Mi i inllcn .is being one ol the lubbers, 
12. Mr. Hollen was subsequently charged w ith aggr, • 1 
kidnaping, and aggravated assault in conjunction with the J une 25, 1995, robber) ot the 
( ...,!!i;...\ ,;.. iiieaiei^ \u i.ayton. 
1 son on a parole 
violation. 
1,4 Mr. William,, Albright, a public defender; w as appointed to represent Mr. 
I Inllcn. 
15. Mi Mecham was ai^o -MTM 
Cella, a public defender, was appointed to represent M.. .
 A*. 
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16 Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella worked closely on the cases and discussed in detail 
the cases and strategy they intended to use. 
17. Mr. Albright received copies of all police reports and witness statements and 
reviewed them. 
18. A preliminary hearing was held for Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham on March 27, 
1996. Mr. Hollen and Mr. Mecham were present and represented by their respective 
appointed attorneys. 
19. At the Preliminary Hearing, Detective Gardner from the Layton City Police 
Department testified and was cross examined by Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella. Detective 
Gardner testified about the procedure followed in presenting the photo lineups to the various 
witnesses. Mr. Albright was able to examine the actual photo array used by the detective to 
identify Mr. Hollen. 
20. Detective Gardner also testified that the photo lineup was presented as six loose 
individual pictures of similar dimensions, that the photos were presented to the witnesses 
separately out of the presence of other witnesses and in no particular order, that the witnesses 
were allowed to thumb through the photos, and each witness was asked whether he or she 
recognized anyone having to do with the robbery, and that each witness identified the photo 
of Mr. Hollen as being one of the robbers. 
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21. Th<\, , ,,..,.,„ .. ,v,\itnesses present al the Preliminary Heanng. Mr 
Albnght was not aware of the identit\ til (In i ^cwihwwvs puNcni ii Hn Pn hnnnaiy 
Hearing. Although the eyewitnesses did not testify at the Preliminary Hearing, Mi. Albnght 
>\as audie that the eyewitnesses recognized Mr. Tlollen and Mr. Mecham from the 
Preliiiiiiii.il i, 1 It.1 ji in .1,. IIn iolilII i » 
22. After the Preliminary Hearing, both Mr. 1 lollen and IV11 Mr 11<1111 \M• i • I»i n111d 
over for trial. 
23. Mi Mini) Ii( lined a pn\aU mwstigaloi Io help with investigation and trial 
preparation. 
24. On May 28, 1996, Mi. Hollen appeared in Couit for arraignment. \ plea of 
not guilty was entered, and the case was set for pre-trial on July 2, 1996, and jury trial on 
Juls I l'»%. 
2 5 . O n J u n e kj, 1 9 9 0 , M i . 1 L J I - « - -1 • •• "• « '"' , 7 ; '"• J """" ! « 
Albright, from prison. The letter w as very v\ ell w ritten and ai ticulalc Mr. Hollen asked that 
I i I \ III" ijjjil tin* I Mi l clla uonsidei the cases of State \ Lopez and State v. Ramirez as they 
bore on the witness identification i I Mi MM ham in I Mi II II i i il 1 IIMMIU tiling 
motion to suppress Mr. Hollen also suggested that Mr. Albnght and Mr. Cella look at the 
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question of merger on the various charges. In addition, Mr. Hollen referred Mr. Albright to 
Ms. Karen Stam, who was the public defender representing him in cases in Salt Lake County. 
26. Mr. Albright was already aware of the Lopez and Ramirez cases. He reviewed 
them again and discussed the situation with Mr. Cella and contacted Attorney Stam in Salt 
Lake City. 
27. Mr. Albright talked further with Detective Gardner about the procedure he used 
in presenting the photo lineup, and he had his investigator interview each witness. The 
investigator reported that all of the witnesses were firm in their identification of Mr. Hollen. 
28. Mr. Albright was aware that witnesses had looked at individuals in three photo 
lineups and one physical lineup prior to the time they looked at the photo lineup in which Mr. 
Hollen's picture was presented to them. Mr. Albright was also aware that Mr. Cella had 
inspected the scene of the robbery, and that Mr. Cella had met there with the prosecutor and 
five of the seven witnesses. While there, Mr. Cella interviewed the witnesses about their 
observations as well as the circumstances and sequence of those observations. Mr. Cella was 
able to observe the physical layout and lighting and even went so far as to run time 
calculations on various aspects of the robbery. Mr. Albright discussed all of this with Mr. 
Cella. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29. amirez case and matters required to be 
considered in determining the reliability of an eyewitness iilrnlifir;iln HI I Ir \\ as JV, iiie lli.il 
the v . Vn • T proof was on the State to show admissibility of an eyewitness identification, 
v ,ii& . e; a motion to suppress the Court wras required to make written findings 
and cur !•!.,.'•.•. i - . he receive, :i 
evidence. 
30. Mr. Albright was jlso luare of the requirements of Lopez relating to 
presentation i«l ph"l" lineups tui identification 
31. With aii ui . examined ilir itlentitVatiou f 
Mr. Hollen In ligh: * .f the requirements of both Lopez and Ramirez. He concluded that the 
procedure used i selective Gardner in presenting the photo lineup was not unduly 
.uuL.es* tiollen 0\ me witnesses show^i ,* muh 
degree of certainty. For those reasons, !». .-• -
chance of success. 
:._ ..... mat the tiling *•! .,Uu< a inotion would only have the effect of 
educating the prosecution innrv ibr ml I ill HIM nul defense .11•*I M.IH illi ailv -li my 
identifieatioh \\ itnesses yet another chance to rehearse their testimony and further solidify 
their K:U;I.ligation 1- 11 * - - - _ —. 
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33. On July 12, 1996, Mr. Albright, along with Mr. Cella, filed a joint Motion in 
Limine to prohibit the State in the instant case from "offering into evidence any reference 
regarding the identification of the Defendant by the witnesses arising from their presence at 
the Preliminary Hearing of March 27,1996 and arising out of the photographic lineup." Mr. 
Albright and Mr. Cella also jointly moved to consolidate certain charges. The State 
stipulated to both of these motions. 
34. Mr. Albright considered hiring an expert to testify about the short comings of 
eyewitness identification but determined that he could do just as effectively with a cautionary 
jury instruction on eyewitness identification. Mr. Albright and Mr. Cella submitted such an 
instruction, and it was given at trial. 
35. Mr. Albright met with the Mr. Hollen on at least three occasions when Mr. 
Hollen was brought to Court for various hearings prior to trial. He discussed with Mr. Hollen 
the fact why they would not file a motion to suppress. Mr. Hollen agreed to follow Mr. 
Albright's advice. 
36. Mr. Albright's investigator also met with Mr. Hollen at the prison on two or 
three different occasions and discussed these same things. 
37. Mr. Albright discussed with Defendant his right to testify. From the beginning, 
Mr. Hollen told Mr. Albright that he would not accept a plea bargain, that he wanted to go 
10 
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to trial - - . .•
 f)osiiK. . Albright spent 
little time discussing Mr. Hollen's right to testify wii :-• 
38. Mr. A lbright was aware that Mr. Hollen had a prior conviction for aggravated 
rohbi'i 'i , ami llial he had been on parole iiwiu piihuii at tla nmc of the robbery ii: June of 
1995. He was • • • : .^bery 
of the Million Dollar Saloon. In that case, it was alleged that Mi. iioihri - i Ivnl 
with Mr. Mecham, and that they had used small .22-caliber pistols. Mr. Hollen had been shot 
in 11 ii it i .i' nt (lit* M L in. IV In vibright was also aware I hat Mi, Hollen was a suspect in the 
robbery of Century Si IIK-JIIT" MI NJ!1 I Av ( "ihr. 
39. With that background, Mr. Albright recommended to Mr. Hollen that he not 
testify, and Mr. Honen agreed to follow that advice. Mr. Hollen acknowledged that he did 
"I vi .Hi'! In kstil'y III) llit I'LI/OHI mil iiCllii picsenee oi thejury at the ume oi trial. 
40. During Mr. Albni*u,'s testimony u n w\ ihr Kulr "MM c\ iilniliitr, Ik'Hi'iny, 
the first reason given by Mr. Albrmht Uv •:. * .. anting to have Mr. I Mien testify at trial was 
iliai, buMid in his investigation, he did not want Mr. I lollen to testify because "he was the one 
that committed this crime " Mi Mbnj'hl I .isi'ii h . <l I-i ntiiiiln I \\\\ ii Ii 
investigation, but on the fact that Mr. Hollen "had a similar charge in Salt Lake for armed 
robbery . and that Mi. I lollen had the same co-defendant in his Salt Lake County case as he 
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had in this case. Mr. Albright grounded his determination that Mr. Hollen had committed 
the crime on the fact that "[h]e never denied the offense." According to Mr. Albright's 
testimony, this was the "first" reason or basis for "feelings" that Mr. Hollen should not testify 
at the trial. 
41. At trial, seven witnesses testified and identified Mr. Hollen as one of the 
persons who had robbed them. He was convicted and this appeal followed. 
42. At the time of the trial, Mr. Hollen was 34 years old, had served a term in 
prison for aggravated robbery, was a high school graduate, and had accumulated about half 
the credit hours necessary for a bachelor's degree in English. 
43. Mr. Albright and Mr. Hollen got along very well during the period that Mr. 
Albright represented Mr. Hollen, and Mr. Hollen relied on him and followed his advice. 
44. None of the issues raised by Mr. Hollen were raised at the time of trial and he 
did not raise such issues in the presence of the Court at the time he waived his right to testify. 
45. Mr. Albright has been a practicing attorney for some seventeen years. He is 
licensed to practice law in California, Utah, and Arizona. He practiced for five years as 
public defender in Salt Lake County and was a prosecutor with the U. S. Attorney's office 
12 
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and the Utah Attorney General's office for approximately three years. Mr. Albright has been 
a Davis County public defender for approximately nine years. 
DATED this ^S**day of March, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
William K. McGuire 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Second District Court Judge 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to be hand-delivered 
a true and correct unexecuted copy of the foregoing RULE 23B EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
FINDINGS OF FACT to the following on this _Qib. daY of March, 1999: 
Mr. William K. McGuire 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
Court Complex 
800 West State Street 
Salt Lake CityrUT\S3&25 
CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to be forwarded by 
facsimile a true and correct unexecuted copy of the foregoing RULE 23B EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING FINDINGS OF FACT to the following on this ftf) day of March, 1999: 
Ms. Laura K. Thompson 
Facsimile NXT80TW4-7706 
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